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Abstract
We introduce a novel notion of probability within quantum history
theories and give a Gleasonesque proof for these assignments. This in-
volves introducing a tentative novel axiom of probability. We also discuss
how we are to interpret these generalised probabilities as partially ordered
notions of preference and we introduce a tentative generalised notion of
Shannon entropy. A Bayesian approach to probability theory is adopted
throughout, thus the axioms we use will be minimal criteria of rationality
rather than ad hoc mathematical axioms.
Keywords: Bayesian Probability, Consistent Histories, Gleason’s Theorem,
Shannon Entropy.
PACS: 02.50.Cw, 03.65.Ta, 04.60.-m.
1 Introduction and Summary
In [1] we postulated a novel notion of probability by generalising Cox’s axioms
of probability [2, 3] in a manner appropriate to quantum theory. In this paper
we wish to go one step further; we will present a uniqueness proof analogous
to Gleason’s theorem for our postulated generalised probabilities. We will be
helped considerably by another analogue of Gleason’s theorem in the literature
[4] which is applied to the decoherence functional in the History Projection
Operator (HPO) formulation of the consistent histories programme [5]. First we
will review results previously discussed [1] and then we will outline the relevant
Gleason-like theorem, its interpretation and, for completeness, its proof. We
will then propose a generalised entropy.
We will adopt a Bayesian approach to probability theory and we will use
Cox’s approach in particular [3]. Probabilities are usually considered real num-
bers because of an association with relative frequencies. As soon as we adopt
an approach to probability theory where we merely assign probabilities as an
ordered notion of preference then there is absolutely no a priori reason to con-
sider probabilities as real numbers. One might try to design ‘zeroth’ axioms of
probability theory which end up ensuring that probabilities are in fact real num-
bers, and then one might introduce further axioms to constrain how we assign
these real numbers to propositions. Such an approach is, however, problematic
because such ‘zeroth’ axioms are rather ad hoc.
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Consider some arbitrary propositions α, β and γ to which we are to assign
probabilities. Consider also a notion of ordering ‘>’ to be defined on the proba-
bility space. Two possible ‘zeroth’ axioms [6], which constrain how this ordering
notion is to behave, are ‘universal transitivity’:
Axiom 0a: If p(α|I) > p(β|I) and p(β|I) > p(γ|I)
then p(α|I) > p(γ|I), (1)
and ‘universal comparability’:
Axiom 0b: For all α, β we have that either p(α|I) > p(β|I)
or p(α|I) < p(β|I) or p(α|I) = p(β|I). (2)
Given these zeroth axioms it would seem natural (although it is still not
strictly necessary) to use real numbers for probability assignments. Axiom 0a is
often considered desirable because probabilities are intended to represent tran-
sitive notions of preference in some sense. Axiom 0b is, however, far more
dubious and there is a history in the literature of people trying not to assume it
(see Appendix A.3 of [6] for references and also see [7] and [8]). Why presume
that we can probabilistically compare all propositions universally, especially in
quantum theory where some propositions are considered ‘incompatible’ or ‘com-
plimentary’? It is prudent to not assume axiom 0b from the outset (it might
be that we are forced to adopt it later). If we were to adopt axiom 0b then it
might be that we will be introducing relationships between probabilities that we
are not justified in invoking—and any problems like nonadditivity and so forth
might be due to such a mistaken assumption.
Rather than adopt these two controversial zeroth axioms let us, for the time
being, use a weaker zeroth axiom that we can all surely agree on:
Axiom 0′ : If α ≤ β then, presumably, p(α|I) ≤ p(β|I), (3)
where ‘≤’ is, in the least, a partial order in the context of both the proposition
space and the space of generalised probabilities1. We call this axiom ‘monoticity’
[9]. So as to avoid confusion with standard probability theory (theories which
obey axioms 0a and 0b) it is prudent to call any assignment which merely obeys
the weaker zeroth axiom (3) by another name: we will call them ‘pedagogical
examples’ or ‘pegs’. Probabilities are then special examples of pegs.
Our task in this paper is then to find a peg theory for a histories algebra.
We will use the histories propositional algebra P(V), where V = ⊗nH, which
was originally introduced by Isham [5]. The natural connectives on this space
of projection operators are the standard ∧,∨,¬ connectives and we use the
standard partial order ≤ upon it [5]. A homogeneous history proposition α is
defined as a time ordered tensor product of projection operators αˆtm ∈ P(H):
α := αˆtn(tn)⊗ αˆtn−1(tn−1)⊗ ...⊗ αˆt1(t1). (4)
1In the context of standard probability theory we could use Venn diagrams to define α ≤ β
using subset inclusion and we would define p(α|I) ≤ p(β|I) using the total ordering of real
numbers.
2
We stay in the Heisenberg picture such that each projection operator has the
dynamics already implicit such that αˆtm(tm) = Uˆ
†(tm− tm−1)αˆtm Uˆ(tm− tm−1)
where αˆtm are Schro¨dinger picture operators. Our novel peg assignments, those
that we suggested in [1], are
p(α|I) := trH(Cαρˆ) (5)
where Cα = αˆtn(tn)αˆtn−1(tn−1)...αˆt1 (t1) and ρˆ is a density operator on H. We
keep an explicit hypothesis I in the notation because such a thing is natural
when discussing probabilities from a Bayesian perspective [10], and it avoids
us confusing peg assignments that are made given different prior information.
Clearly these pegs might obey (3) by relating the natural partial order on P(V)
to some partial order on C. Once we introduce further axioms that these pegs
ought to obey—other than (3)—then we will be able to speculate what this
partial order on the peg space might be.
We proposed these pegs for the history algebra P(V) because they are addi-
tive for disjoint homogeneous history propositions [1]—thus these complex pegs
seem to behave something like we expect probabilities should. Now we aim to
show that we can derive these pegs from axioms analogous to Cox’s axioms of
probability theory applied to the HPO algebra using an analogue of Gleason’s
theorem.
2 A Gleason Analogue
So, let us remind ourselves of what Gleason’s theorem [11] tells us. Gleason’s
theorem is about trying to assign probabilities to a quantum propositional alge-
bra. In standard quantum theory the relevant propositional algebra is taken to
be P(H), the set of projection operators upon a Hilbert space H, where the nat-
ural logical connectives on P(H) are ∧,∨,¬ and we denote the standard partial
order relation ‘≤’. So, naturally, a probability assignment should obey certain
rules which we shall use to define what is often, perhaps confusingly, called a
state (we call it a state more because of what we end up proving). A state σ ∈ S
is a real valued function on P(H) which has the following properties:
1. Positivity: σ(Pˆ ) ≥ 0 for all Pˆ ∈ P(H),
2. Additivity: if Pˆ and Rˆ are disjoint—Pˆ ∧ Rˆ = 0ˆ—then σ(Pˆ ∨ Rˆ) = σ(Pˆ ) +
σ(Rˆ),
3. Normalisation: σ(1ˆ) = 1,
where 0ˆ ∈ P(H) is the proposition that is always false, and 1ˆ ∈ P(H) is the
proposition that is always true. Gleason’s theorem is simply that states assigned
to P(H), for dimH > 2, are in one-to-one correspondence with density matrices
on H such that
σρ(Pˆ ) = tr(Pˆ ρˆ) for all Pˆ ∈ P(H). (6)
One takes the propositional algebra of projection operators, makes basic as-
sumptions about how probabilities ought to behave, and one derives that such
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probability assignments are in one-to-one correspondence with density matri-
ces. The axioms of probability theory ensure the density matrix structure of
quantum theory.
In analogy with Gleason’s theorem we should list a set of axioms that our
pegs should obey and then try and derive the theorem from there. For these
axioms, we argue, we should look to Cox’s axioms of probability theory which
ensure that we don’t introduce functional relationships between peg assignments
that aren’t rationally justified. Cox’s ∧-axiom is simply that the pegs we peg
to propositions conjoined using the ‘and’ operation should be limited to be
functionally dependent only on some very specific pegs:
p(α ∧ β|I) := F [p(α|βI), p(β|I)] (7)
where F is an arbitrary function that is sufficiently well-behaved for our pur-
poses. Similarly, Cox’s ¬-axiom is that the peg we peg to the negation of a
proposition should only functionally depend upon the peg of the proposition
before it was negated:
p(¬α|I) := G[p(α|I)]. (8)
These two axioms are criteria of rationality that are at the heart of Cox’s ap-
proach to probability theory and these are all he needed (except for the ad-
ditional assumption that probabilities are real numbers) in order to prove the
basics of probability theory as applied to a Boolean algebra of propositions.
Cox’s two axioms suggest we should use a peg that is additive for disjoint
history propositions and that is normalised [3]. It turns out that this will not
be sufficient for our peg theory; we will need a further axiom. Luckily one is
forthcoming. Note that in the HPO formulation of history theories we have the
three natural logical connectives ∧,∨,¬ which correspond roughly to ‘and’, ‘or’
and ‘negation’ operations (although with the standard non-distributivity issue
we have in quantum theory). Clearly, however, when going from projection
operators defined at a single-time to explicitly history orientated propositions
there is another natural connective, namely changing the temporal order. As
such we can define an operatorM which reverses the order on any tensor product
vector, M(v1 ⊗ v2 ⊗ ...vm) := (vm ⊗ vm−1 ⊗ ...v1). Thus the temporal reversal
of the Heisenberg picture history proposition α is given by:
⊳ α := MαM = αˆt1(t1)⊗ αˆt2(t2)⊗ ...⊗ αˆtn(tn). (9)
Note that ⊳ reverses both the kinematical and the dynamical temporal or-
derings because we are in the Heisenberg picture (cf. [12]). Applying ⊳ twice in
this manner obviously gives back the same history proposition; behaviour that
is analogous to the ‘negation’ operation. Hence we should introduce a third peg
axiom analogous to (8):
p(⊳α|I) := H [p(α|I)] (10)
where H is an arbitrary function that is sufficiently well-behaved for our pur-
poses. The peg we assign to such a proposition should be assigned in a non-
contextual manner according to (10). Clearly, by Youssef’s argument [7], we
could use complex numbers and still keep consistency with analogues of Cox’s
two axioms. Our tentative third axiom seems to give our pegs an ‘extra degree
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of freedom’. Using real numbers would not be a possibility for a peg that also
obeys (10) and luckily we are using the uncontroversial weaker zeroth axiom
(3). Hence it might be that we can find a peg which obeys (3), (7), (8) and
(10).
In analogy with how we define states in Gleason’s theorem let us define
complex assignments as maps l : P(V)→ C which obey the following rules:
1. Conjugation. l(α)∗ = l(⊳α) for all α,
2. Additivity. If α and β are disjoint then l(α ∨ β) = l(α) + l(β),
3. Normalisation. l(1) = 1.
We use the similar notation as we used for the Hilbert space H because V is
still a Hilbert space (although we leave the ‘hats’ off operators in V). This is an
advantage of using Isham’s HPO formulation of the history algebra [5].
Note that the peg axioms (7), (8) and (10) do not uniquely ensure that we
must use the complex assignments l—just as Cox’s axioms in standard probabil-
ity theory don’t ensure that we must use real numbers per se. The peg axioms
ensure that, whatever assignments we do use for convenience, such assignments
at least obey the relevant criteria of rationality. Hence we do not argue that
the complex assignments l are uniquely the only pegs we could use, but clearly
the maps l do obey (7), (8) and (10) and might yet obey (3) for some partial
order on C. One might even argue that it is not the particular assignments
that matter; it is the catalogue of functional relationships between them that
are important (these we categorise axiomatically using analogues of Cox’s ax-
ioms). Nonetheless, it is convenient to use particular representations (just as it
is convenient to use real numbers in standard Bayesian probability theory).
Can we now start to tackle a proof of a Gleason-like theorem for these
complex assignments l? In fact, the result follows from an analogue of Gleason’s
theorem for decoherence functionals already in the literature [4].
Let us first review some identities [4]. Note that
trH(Aˆ1Aˆ2...Aˆn) = tr⊗nH(Aˆ1 ⊗ Aˆ2 ⊗ ...AˆnS) (11)
where Aˆm are arbitrary self adjoint operators on H and S is a linear operator
S : ⊗nH → ⊗nH defined on product vectors by
S(v1 ⊗ v2 ⊗ ...⊗ vn) := v2 ⊗ v3 ⊗ ...⊗ vn ⊗ v1 (12)
and extended by linearity and continuity to give a unitary operator on ⊗nH.
We can swap between the Heisenberg and Schro¨dinger pictures using:
trH(Cα) = tr⊗nH(αˆtn ⊗ αˆtn−1 ⊗ ...αˆt1S
U ). (13)
where the αˆtm are Schro¨dinger picture projection operators and S
U := (Uˆ †
1
⊗
...⊗ Uˆ †n)S(Uˆ1 ⊗ ...⊗ Uˆn).
In an analogous way [4], we can absorb the initial state into an operator
defined on V = ⊗nH using the identity (11). Note that
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trH(Aˆ1Aˆ2...Aˆn)
= tr⊗nH((Aˆ1 ⊗ Aˆ2 ⊗ ...Aˆn−1 ⊗ 1n)(11 ⊗ 12 ⊗ ...1n−1 ⊗ Aˆn)S) (14)
= tr⊗nH((Aˆ1 ⊗ Aˆ2 ⊗ ...Aˆn−1 ⊗ 1n)Y ) (15)
= tr⊗n−1H((Aˆ1 ⊗ Aˆ2 ⊗ ...Aˆn−1Y
′) (16)
where Y ′ is obtained from Y by tracing over a complete set of states for the nth
Hilbert space. The form of (11) is preserved under removing an operator by the
action of a partial tracing, and is also preserved when removing the dynamics
from around each single-time proposition in the history proposition.
So, using these identities we can absorb all the dynamics and initial state
into some operator Z such that:
trH(Cαρˆ) = tr⊗nH(αˆtn ⊗ αˆtn−1 ...⊗ αˆt1Zρ,H). (17)
Note that the LHS of (17) is in the Heisenberg picture whereas the RHS is
in the Schro¨dinger picture—we have split the dynamics and kinematics into
distinct entities. There are good reasons for doing this as it would allow us to
investigate the distinction between the two forms of temporal orderings [12].
But note that we can stay within the Heisenberg picture if we wish (for it is, by
far, the preferable picture [13]); we keep the dynamics around the corresponding
projection operators and absorb just the initial state into an operator Y :
trH(Cαρˆ) = tr⊗nH(αˆtn(tn)⊗ αˆtn−1(tn−1)⊗ ...αˆt1(t1)Yρ). (18)
The above ensures that we can put our tentative assignment into ‘Gleason’
form. Now we can prove an analogue of Gleason’s theorem for such operators
Yρ. The theorem and proof follows the analysis in [4] almost word for word.
There are, however, distinguishing features and, for completeness, we repeat the
analysis here since the proof is so short.
Theorem
If dim V > 2, the complex assignments l are in one-to-one correspondence with
operators Y on V = ⊗nH according to the rule
l(α) = trV(αY ) (19)
with the restrictions that:
a) Y † =MYM (20)
b) trV(Y ) = 1 (21)
whereM is an operator that reverses the order of the entries in a tensor product
vector; M(v1 ⊗ v2 ⊗ ...vm) := (vm ⊗ vm−1 ⊗ ...v1).
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Proof
In one direction, the theorem is trivial; if a function l is defined by the right
hand side of (19) it clearly obeys the crucial additivity condition. The extra
requirements (20) and (21) ensure normalisation and conjugation requirements.
Conversely, let l : P(V) → C be a complex assignment. The proof that it
must have the form (19) exploits Gleason’s theorem applied to P(V).
Let Re l and Im l denote the real and imaginary parts of l so that
l(α) = Re l(α) + Im l(α) (22)
where Re l(α) ∈ R and Im l(α) ∈ R. The additivity condition on l means
that Re l(α) and Im l(α) are additive functions on P(V), i.e., Re l(α1 ∨ α2) =
Re l(α1) +Re l(α2) for any disjoint pair α1, α2 of projectors and similarly for
Im l. We have that l(α) is a continuous function of its argument and hence
α 7→ l(α) is a continuous function on P(V), as are its real and imaginary parts.
However the set of all projectors in the finite dimensional space V is a finite
disjoint union of Grassman manifolds and is hence compact. It follows that the
functions α 7→ Re l(α) and α 7→ Im l(α) are bounded below and above. On the
other hand, for any r ∈ R, the quantity
κr(α) := rdim(α) = rtr(α) (23)
is a real additive function of α, and hence so are Re l+κr and Im l+κs for any
r, s ∈ R. We can choose an r such that Re l+ κr ≥ 0 for all α (and s such that
Im l + κs ≥ 0) and due to an upper bound we can choose positive real scale
factors µ and ν such that for all α we have that
0 ≤ µ(Re l+ κr)(α) ≤ 1 (24)
0 ≤ ν(Im l + κs)(α) ≤ 1. (25)
These inequalities plus the additivity property show that, for each α ∈ P(V),
the quantities α 7→ µ(Re l+ κr)(α) and α 7→ ν(Im l+ κs)(α) are states on the
lattice P(V). Then Gleason’s theorem shows that there exists a pair of density
matrices ρ1 and ρ2 on V such that for all α ∈ P(V),
µ(Re l + κr)(α) = trV(ρ
1α) (26)
ν(Im l + κs)(α) = trV(ρ
2α) (27)
and so
Re l(α) = trV((
1
µ
ρ1 − r)α) = trV(Y
1α) (28)
Im l(α) = trV((
1
ν
ρ2 − s)α) = trV(Y
2α) (29)
where Y 1 := 1
µ
ρ1 − r and Y 2 := 1
ν
ρ2 − s. Thus we have shown the existence of
a family of operators Y := Y 1 + iY 2 on V such that
lρ(α) = trV(αYρ) (30)
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This completes the proof of the theorem because the conditions (20) and (21)
follow at once from the conjugation and normalisation conditions on complex
assignments. 
We do not discuss any extensions to infinite dimensional cases. We add the
subscript ρ to Y to emphasise that it depends upon the initial state; it is antici-
pated that Yρ can be decomposed into some operators on V which are universally
defined (through relations between traces of products of operators and traces
of tensor product operators) and some operators that are related to the initial
state. Clearly the Y operators on V and density operators on H are intimately
related, the task is now to investigate the properties and interpretation of these
pegs. But, in the least, we can put our assignment (5) into the form (30) for
which we have an analogue of Gleason’s theorem.
One issue that we have to identify is that we have promoted the operation
⊳ to a connective on par with ∨,∧,¬, and it may not seem natural to some to
do this. We considered it natural because we were going from a space P(H)
which identified propositions at a single time to a space P(V) which explicitly
identified history propositions. So we need a connective that can relate different
temporal orderings. One might then query, why specifically ⊳? Why not some
other operation, like making any permutation of single-time entries? Staying
in the Heisenberg picture ensures that the dynamics are already taken care
of, and permuting the entries would mess up this fact—hence we only discuss
a connective that maintains the dynamical relationships between single-time
propositions.
Note that we do not need to use the monoticity axiom (3) for Gleason-like
proofs; it is, in some sense, redundant. Nonetheless, how might our pegs obey
monoticity? In P(V) we have the following condition:
0 ≤ α ≤ 1 for all α ∈ P(V). (31)
For our pegs we have that p(0|I) = 0 and P (1|I) = 1 and hence, by monoticity,
we must, in the least, demand that
0 ≤ p(α|I) ≤ 1 for all α ∈ P(V). (32)
One tentative partial order might look something like Fig.(1). This partial or-
der2 has the added advantage as we are unable to relate p(⊳α|I) and p(α|I)
using it (the partial ordering is symmetric in the real axis and complex conju-
gation represents time reversal). Since, by the partial order on P(V), α NR ⊳α
(where NR stands for ‘not related to by the relevant partial order’) we ought to
demand this of the peg space as well, such that p(⊳α|I) NR p(α|I). Also, this
partial order reduces to the standard probabilities when we move to the real
line between 0 and 1.
Note, however, that there are many partial orders on C and there might be
another applicable one—we introduce the partial order represented by Fig.(1)
2Equivalently, one can picture the same partial order as allowing many different paths from
uncertainty to certainty such that these paths are symmetric in the real axis. These paths
would look like the lines of magnetic flux between North (0) and South (1) magnetic poles in
2D (not illustrated). This absolves us of Jaynes’ argument against comparative probability
theories—ones that don’t obey axiom 0b—by allowing many dense paths from 0 to 1, see the
appendix of [6]).
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Re (p)0 1
qq
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✗✔
✖✕
✗✔
Figure 1: Contour lines of pegs of equivalent size by a suggested
partial order on C. The ‘height’ of each contour gets larger starting
from the circle around 0 until we reach the circle around 1.
to emphasise that monoticity will provide constraints for the partial orders that
we can use. For disjoint propositions α and β we have that α ≤ ¬β hence the
monoticity requirement ensures that p(α|I) ≤ 1 − p(β|I) which is satisfied as
long as (32) is. The constraint (32) thus ensures a class of partial orders that
might be useful and Fig.(1) seems the most apt.
Even obeying all the peg axioms we have to hand it is still very difficult
to interpret these pegs as ‘probabilities’ per se because we are taught again
and again that probabilities are real numbers. However, remember that there
is no a priori reason to regard probabilities as real numbers, they are merely
magnitudes that we use in order to assign a partially ordered notion of preference
to propositions.
3 Discussion
Having an analogue of Gleason’s theorem for our pegs is not enough; we now
need to argue why we should use such complex pegs in the first place. We have
given an argument based on rejecting axiom 0b so now it is important to discuss
the factitious problems that are solved by rejecting it. If we keep axiom 0b then,
by the very fact that we will be comparing propositions in a manner that is not
justified rationally, we will be introducing relations within the probability space
that are not underpinned by relations in the proposition space. Hence we call
such relations in the probability space ‘factitious’.
The language we have used here is perhaps quite telling. Our use of the
term ‘factitious’ harks back to Einstein’s use of the term. Clearly, if we adopt a
relational approach to theory building (one which obeys Leibniz’s principles of
relationalism [14]) we do not want to introduce factitious elements in any theory.
Cox adopted a rationalist approach analogous to relationalism—he gave a for-
mulation of probability theory which ensures that factitious functional relations
between propositions, quantified using pegs, are never introduced. Instead we
only maintain those functional relationships that we can justify. Clearly this
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peg approach might therefore be useful in the quantum gravity domain where
an explicitly relational approach is often considered a requirement. One might
na¨ıvely argue that, in addition to a relational notion of spacetime, one needs a
relational notion of probability. In the least it would be prudent to adopt an
approach to probability theory based upon criteria of rationality rather than ad
hoc axioms.
Hence it is plausible that problems like nonlocality are factitious problems
that are caused by invoking a probability theory which does not have sufficient
structure. Thus a Bayesian approach may bring locality back to quantum theory,
just as Einstein bought locality back to gravitational theories in building general
relativity [15]—in fact this is the major reason many invoke Bayesian reasoning
within quantum theory [16] (although one does not need to adopt as drastic a
peg theory as we adopt here in order to tentatively deny nonlocality).
Similarly, the problem of hidden variables might also be factitious. The
Kochen-Specker theorem [17] seems [18] to prove that we cannot assign defini-
tive values to variables prior to measurement in quantum theory. This is ob-
viously compatible with a Bayesian approach to ignorance—we cannot assign
such values because we are explicitly presuming we are ignorant of them.
These complex pegs are intimately related to the approaches of Feynman
[19] and Hartle [20] who invoke real ‘probabilities’ that can lie outside of [0, 1].
Hartle’s virtual ‘probabilities’ are explicitly found using the real parts of our
complex pegs (5) which, in turn, were originally introduced by Goldstein and
Page [21] in their linearly positive histories approach. Thus the linearly positive
histories and the consistent histories programmes appear naturally within this
peg framework. If we wish to discuss real Bayesian probabilities we could follow
the linearly positive histories programme and take the real parts of our pegs and
ensure a linearly positive condition [22]. Similarly, if we wish to discuss relative
frequencies we could follow the consistent histories programme and take the real
parts of our complex pegs and define a consistency condition stronger than linear
positivity [23]. Even so, we are still wary of invoking complex pegs because they
are so alien to our usual notion of relative frequency. Note, however, that we are
not wholly uncomfortable as such complex pegs appear naturally in quantum
theory—the generalised Berry phase is derived from such complex pegs [24] and
is an experimentally verifiable quantity (using ensembles of experiments). As
such, we can combine such phases and frequentist notions into one probabilistic
entity using axioms that were outlined over 60 years ago by Cox [2].
In the history of science we have been rather ambiguous about what the word
‘probability’ means. Some call relative frequencies ‘probabilities’ even though
they don’t behave in the same manner as the term in common parlance. Simi-
larly we have called certain non-additive numbers in quantum theory ‘probabil-
ities’ even when they do not obey axioms of probability—nor axioms of relative
frequency (which are necessarily additive). We might call our complex pegs
‘probabilities’ because at least they do obey rational probabilistic axioms, but
perhaps we would make a similar category error or confuse the issue by doing so;
hence, for the want of a better name, we have resorted to calling them ‘pegs’—at
least it begins with a ‘p’ so we don’t need to change our notation. So far we
have two different kinds of pegs but there may be more. We have objects that
obey Cox’s two axioms which are real; we might call these ‘round pegs’. We also
have these objects that obey analogues of Cox’s two axioms, and our tentative
third, which are complex. Let us call these ‘square pegs’. These names lead
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naturally to a playful, albeit unfortunately sardonic, metaphor for what we are
trying to do. A baby metaphor for science perhaps. We are trying to find the
right-shaped peg for the corresponding hole and we must reject the pegs that
do not fit snugly. When dealing with a histories algebra we argue that these
complex pegs fit rather snugly.
4 Entropy
With a generalisation of probability to hand, we must also begin to discuss a
generalisation of entropy—a complimentary concept that is often just as impor-
tant as a good notion of probability. Perhaps we don’t have to search very far
for such a generalisation.
First of all, how should a notion of entropy behave? It should behave, in
part, like a probability. It should probably be a transitive or monotonic notion of
preference in some sense [25]. It should reflect the space of pegs in a natural way.
Hence the first na¨ıve object to suggest is simply a generalisation of Shannon’s
entropy:
S[P (1α|I)] := −KS
n∑
i=1
p(αi|I) ln p(αi|I) (33)
where P (1α|I) := {p(αi|I) : i = 1, 2...Nα} and KS is a constant. Does this ob-
ject S[·] behave like an entropy should? Does it, for example, obey the grouping
property [26]; a property that Shannon suggests is natural for any notion of
entropy [27]. Consider the complete—disjoint and exhaustive—set {αi} split
up into groups labeled by an integer g. We could consider the peg-entropy (33)
of the original set as split up into the peg-entropy of each of the groups and the
peg-entropy as to which group g = 1, 2, ..., NG one should use; this alternative
way of looking at the peg-entropy (33) of the set should be equivalent to not
splitting {αi} into groups (this is the grouping property). How we split the en-
tropy into groups should not make a difference. We can split up the peg-entropy
as follows:
S[P (1α|I)] := −KS
NG∑
g
∑
i∈g
p(αi|I) ln p(αi|I). (34)
The complex peg we assign to a group g is simply
p(g|I) =
∑
i∈g
p(αi|I). (35)
So now we must ask ourselves whether
S[P (1α|I)] = S[P (1G|I)] +
∑
g
p(g|I)Sg (36)
where
S[P (1G|I)] := −KS
NG∑
g
p(g|I) ln p(g|I) (37)
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and
Sg := −KS
∑
i∈g
p(αi|gI) ln p(αi|gI). (38)
In order to work this out we need to work out what pegs we should assign
to the histories {αi : i ∈ g} upon the knowledge that the group g is the correct
group. Thus we need a notion of conditioning. We need to work out what
conditional pegs we should use and whether it allows (33) to obey the grouping
property.
Using Bayes’ rule in our complex peg framework is quite interesting:
p(αi|gI) =
p(g|αiI)p(αi)
p(g|I)
. (39)
It is natural to assign p(g|αiI) = 1 if we know that αi is in the group g (we
are normalising due to (8) cf. [3]). Hence we should assign
p(αi|gI) =
p(αi|I)
p(g|I)
(40)
to conditional grouping pegs. Does this allow the grouping property to be
satisfied? Note that for y, z ∈ C we do not necessarily have that ln y
z
= ln y−ln z
because of different branches of the logarithm function; it only works if −pi <
(arg(x)− arg(y)) < pi. Complex logarithms behave as follows:
ln(reiθ) = ln r + iθ (41)
where we may choose the principle value of θ. Renaming the index i with j so
as not to confuse it with imaginary components, it is therefore clear that:
∑
j
ln
p(αj |I)
p(g|I)
=
∑
j
(ln
|p(αj |I)|
|p(g|I)|
+ iθj − iθg) (42)
where θj = arg[p(α
j |I)] and θg = arg[p(g|I)].
So, using the definition of the complex logarithm, we have that
−
∑
j∈g
p(αj |I) ln p(αj |I) = −p(g|I)
∑
j∈g
p(αj |I)
p(g|I)
ln
p(αj |I)
p(g|I)
−p(g|I) ln p(g|I). (43)
Thus we do have the grouping property for our test entropy functional (33) i.e.
we have that
S[P (1α|I)] = S[P (1G|I)] +
∑
g
p(g|I)Sg + 2mpii (44)
where m is an integer—(33) is satisfied as long as we identify the different
branches of the logarithm.
What, other than the grouping property, should an entropy functional obey
so as to be a useful definition of uncertainty or information? According to
Shannon [27], S[·] should be continuous in the pegs. When all the pegs are
equal (and hence real pi =
1
n
) then it should be a monotonic increasing function
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of n. Hence S[·] should correspond to the standard Shannon entropy for the
real subset of complex pegs. Clearly (33) is very plausible as a generalisation
of Shannon entropy that is apt for quantum histories. But, like the Shannon
entropy for real probabilities, is it possible to prove that we must use (33)
because it is the only functional that fits the required desiderata up to some
equivalence of functionals? This we can’t yet answer.
Are strong additivity and concavity also satisfied by this peg-entropy? In
order to find out we need to define a conditional peg-entropy; presumably this
involves Bayes’ rule which is satisfied by our complex pegs since the ∧-operation
is associative [3]. Lets define the conditional peg-entropy in an analogous way
to how we define conditional Shannon entropies:
S[P (1α|1βI)] :=
∑
j
p(βj |I)S[P (1α|β
jI)] (45)
= −KS
∑
j
p(βj |I)
∑
i
p(αi|βjI) ln p(αi|βjI). (46)
And thus we can check whether the following ‘strong additivity’ condition is
satisfied by S[·]:
S[P (1α ∧ 1β|I)] = S[P (1α|I)] + S[P (1β |1αI)]
= S[P (1β |I)] + S[P (1α|1βI)]. (47)
We can also check whether the following ‘concavity’ condition is satisfied:
S[P (1α|I)] ≥ S[P (1α|1βI)]. (48)
Note that P (1α ∧ 1β |I) := {p(α
i ∧ βj |I) : i = 1, 2, ...nα and j = 1, 2, ...nβ}. So
we can work out the LHS of (47) to be
S[P (1α ∧ 1β |I)] = −KS
∑
i
∑
j
p(αi ∧ βj |I) ln p(αi ∧ βj |I). (49)
We can also work out the RHS (second decomposition) of (47):
−KS
∑
j
p(βj |I) ln p(βj |I)−KS
∑
j
p(βj |I)
∑
i
p(αi|βjI) ln p(αi|βjI). (50)
Now, p(αi ∧βj |I) = p(αi|βjI)p(βj |I) because Cox’s axioms ensure that this
is the case. Note that
∑
i p(α
i|βjI) = 1 for each j as long as αi all commute
with βj . Hence we can identify the LHS and RHS and thus (47) is satisfied for
sets of commuting histories. Clearly it is natural that strong additivity applies
for commuting histories because, in such cases, we can easily interpret the two
sets of history propositions to be compatible. If they do not commute then
there is no a priori reason we should demand strong additivity, just as there is
no a priori reason we should demand comparability (by the dubious axiom 0b)
of probabilities in such cases.
In order to work out when (48) is also satisfied by our novel notion of entropy
we would have to decide what partial order on the space C we ought to use.
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Monoticity provides significant constraints upon what partial orders we can use
and, as we argued above, it seems we should use the partial order illustrated in
Fig.(1) for pegs. The partial order on the peg space will inform the partial order
on the peg-entropy space (although perhaps scaled by the KS constant). Con-
cavity might then be satisfied, at least for a subset of histories. Having shown
that our tentative notion (33) obeys the grouping property (albeit identifying
branches of the logarithm), it is a matter only of mathematical consequence
whether our peg-entropy also obeys other convenient identities like strong ad-
ditivity and concavity (these identities are not axioms per se). It is clear, then,
that (33) is a plausible generalisation of entropy for quantum history theories
but we have not yet proved whether all peg-entropies that obey the grouping
property for complex pegs must be of this form.
5 Conclusion
In quantum theory we use Gleason’s theorem to justify the probabilistic assign-
ments we give to projection operators. However, as soon as we begin to discuss
more than one single projection operator—when we begin to discuss history
propositions—we have to postulate a notion of state collapse in order to de-
fine probabilities. However, such postulated probabilities are non-additive and
many problems or issues arise because of this. From a Bayesian perspective it
is even dubious to call such things ‘probabilities’ because they are non-additive
and thus alien to our normal notion of probability [28]. Problems with nonlo-
cality also arise by discussing propositions that involve two or more times (in
a given frame of reference). Hence it is natural to tackle this problem head-on
and define a propositional space that includes multi-time propositions. Since
we do not want to give any causal bias to the peg or probability theory that we
use [29] it seems prudent to put timelike and spacelike separated propositions
on the same footing [30]; hence we might na¨ıvely like to use tensor products
to produce history propositions (this is the HPO algebra)3. Rather than pos-
tulate dubious notions of state collapse one can then derive a monotonic peg
for such history propositions, and one can do such a thing without getting into
the problems of non-additivity and, tentatively, nonlocality. There also exists a
plausible generalisation of Shannon entropy for such pegs. Of course such com-
plex pegs are alien to our standard notion of probability. However, our standard
notion of probability is rather alien too; when you get down to it, what really
does the term ‘probability’ mean? The interpretation of probabilities is clearly,
historically speaking, a debatable issue and hence it is necessary to axiomatise
and formalise a relational approach. Such an approach will ensure that, even if
we don’t know with full clarity what such concepts mean, we will, in the least,
not introduce functional relationships between pegs that we are not justified in
introducing.
So we cannot yet give a clear answer to the question: What are probabilities?
One can, however, begin to answer another quite daunting question: Why do
we naturally find complex numbers in quantum theory?
3Of course, in full generality, one would prefer to use a fully relational propositional algebra.
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